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Abstract 
ISIS is a splinter terrorist group from Al-Qaeda that became a global threat in the last two decades. Its 
recruitment method that is different from its predecessor, also how it utilizes social media effectively, made them 
able to spread terror to every part of the world and conquer many territories of Iraq and Syria in order to fulfill 
their goal of a caliphate. However, recent development shows ISIS will lose their base of operation in both 
countries and there are signs of ISIS shifting their focus to Southeast Asia, with regards to the Marawi conquest. 
This paper aims to discuss how such development affects ISIS in Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in 
Southeast Asia and how the government responds to the situation. 
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Abstrak 
ISIS adalah kelompok teroris pecahan dari Al-Qaeda yang menjadi ancaman global dalam hampir dua 
dekade terakhir. Metode perekrutan anggota ISIS yang berbeda dari pendahulunya, serta bagaimana ISIS 
memanfaatkan sosial media dengan efektif membuat kelompok ini dapat menyebarkan teror di seluruh dunia dan 
menguasai banyak wilayah di Irak dan Suriah untuk memenuhi tujuan negara kekhalifahan mereka. Namun, 
perkembangan terkini menunjukkan ISIS akan kehilangan basis operasinya di kedua negara tersebut dan 
terdapat tanda bahwa ISIS akan mengalihkan fokus mereka ke Asia Tenggara dengan berkaca pada peristiwa 
penaklukan Marawi. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mendiskusikan bagaimana perkembangan tersebut berpengaruh 
pada ISIS di Indonesia sebagai negara Muslim terbesar di Asia Tenggara dan bagaimana pemerintah 
meresponnya. 
 
Kata Kunci: isis; al-qaeda; media sosial; pejuang asing; indonesia. 
 
Introduction 
 Terrorism has evolved from acts of 
terror with political motives related to civil 
wars, struggle of independence, etc to a 
representation of clash between civilizations, 
with the focus of the West against Islam, 
especially in the last decade. What grew from 
Afghanistan struggle against the Soviet 
Union‟s Invasion in the 1980s was a bloom of 
terrorist organizations that believes the 
narrative that western countries are a threat to 
Islam, and therefore must be retaliated in a 
holy war or Jihad.  The turning point is the 
9/11 attack on the United States by Al-Qaeda, 
it has redefined the focus of terrorism and have 
created a “global war on terror” era. 
 With the invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the threat of Al-Qaeda has waned after 
years have passed. However, it has taken a new 
form in the name of Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), and the technological 
advancement of internet have also enhanced 
how ISIS conduct its attacks, recruit more 
members, and expand its influence globally. 
With regards to social media, ISIS has the 
potential to radicalize every individual that 
have access to the internet. ISIS can also 
coordinate its attack with peer to peer 
messaging applications, an evolution from Al-
Qaeda‟s use of internet for spreading 
propaganda only. The implication of such 
requires all governments that are committed to 
the global war on terror to adapt their strategy 
that includes the use of internet and social 
media. 
 The underlying threat of ISIS utilizing 
the social media is the increase of 
unpredictability whether when, where and who 
will spread terror, thus increasing the threat 
level. It also suggests that the spread of 
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propaganda material will be harder to contain 
as information can be relayed rapidly and with 
discreet. This essay aims to analyze the current 
implication and will divide the essay with the 
following outline: First it will discuss the 
history of ISIS and its difference with Al-
Qaeda, how ISIS then evolved using social 
media to coordinate attacks and spread its 
influence in the West, its group current 
condition, and lastly, the shift of focus to 
Southeast Asia particularly Indonesia with 
regards to how the government address the 
situation. 
  
ISIS and Al-Qaeda, the Difference 
The creation of ISIS dates back from 
remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) post U.S 
Invasion to Iraq, where Abu Musab al 
Zarqawi, born from Jordan joined 
Afghanistan‟s conflict against the Soviet 
Union in 1989. He operated from Peshawar, a 
Pakistani border known as one of the source of 
Islamic radicalism. From there he developed 
his fundamentalist Salafist faith, an ideology 
branch from Sunni Islam, and hatred towards 
Shiite and moderate Muslims. It was also 
suspected that Zarqawi met with Osama bin 
Laden for the first time, but the two have 
different mission whereas Osama bin Laden 
insist in inciting a global holy war against U.S 
and the West, Zarqawi then led his war to 
Israel and Jordan.
 1
 At that time the group that 
Zarqawi formed was called the Al-Tawhid 
wal-Jihad (TwJ), backed by the Taliban 
movement to counter against the U.S Invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001.  
Zarqawi, having increased his network 
of terrorist contacts and rising through the 
ranks have made himself a high-profile target 
and was forced to move between Iran, Syria, 
Lebanon, and the Kurdish-controlled areas of 
                                                          
1
 M.J Kirdar “Al Qaeda in Iraq”, CSIS, June 2011, 
accessed 8 July 2017, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/110614_Kirdar
_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf. Pg. 3. 
Northern Iraq.
2
 He was still in contact with Al-
Qaeda through Seif al-Adel, Osama‟s Security 
Chief that favored Zarqawi‟s mission against 
the nearer enemy (Israel and Jordan). Adel 
eventually managed to convince Zarqawi to 
transfer to Iraq, and in the country Zarqawi 
frequently travelled to the “Sunni Triangle” a 
100-square mile area between Baghdad, 
Ramadi, and Tikrit where he further developed 
his network and presence, eventually taking an 
elevated role as a conduit for all foreign 
fighters coming to Iraq in preparation for the 
U.S Invasion.
3
   
 As the Invasion takes place in 2003, 
Zarqawi had already prepared the necessary 
strategies to counter the invading force, most 
notably entangling U.S forces with a Sunni-
Shiite civil war through attacking Shiite targets 
and provoking retaliatory responses against 
Sunni communities.
4
 A year later, Zarqawi was 
proclaimed as the Emir of the “Islamic 
caliphate (state) in Al-Fallujah” and he 
declared his allegiance to Osama bin Laden, 
transforming TwJ into Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI).
5
 
Backlash against Zarqawi‟s popularity 
begin in 2005 where the national elections 
resulted in tensions between factions in the 
insurgency, Zarqawi‟s tactic of targeting 
Shiites and suicide bombings that affects 
innocent Muslims have made nationalists in 
the faction distanced themselves from Zarqawi. 
Eventually it reached its peak when AQI‟s 
bombings in Jordan‟s Amman hotel killed 60 
innocents, inciting a demonstration in the 
streets.
6
 A year later, after attempts to lower 
the backlash by the public, Zarqawi was kill by 
a U.S Airstrike.  
The death of Zarqawi does not hinder 
AQI‟ brutal method in their operations, 
resulting in a retaliatory response where Sunni 
tribesman were infuriated with AQI attempting 
                                                          
2
 Ibid, pg. 3. accessed 8 July 2017 
3
 Ibid, pg.3. accessed 8 July 2017 
4
 Ibid, pg. 4. accessed 8 July 2017 
5
 Ibid, pg. 4. accessed 8 July 2017 
6
 Ibid, pg. 4. accessed 8 July 2017 
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to take over their territory, AQI‟s effort to 
reduce the impact of this backlash were to 
rebrand itself with the creation of Islamic State 
in Iraq (ISI).  The backlash reduced the 
number of IS fighters in Iraq significantly, 
until Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki of Iraq 
arrested Sunni political leaders and gave Shia 
tribes disproportionate benefits which resulted 
in increased sectarian conflict leading to ISI 
gathering support from Sunni tribes again.
7
 A 
year later, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi became the 
leader of ISI and expanded the presence of the 
terrorist group to Syria through the Nusra 
Front group in 2012.  
 
How ISIS Became a Western Threat  
As the popularity of Al-Qaeda 
dwindled down after the 9/11 attack and U.S 
Invasion to Afghanistan, ISIS appeared to 
replace Al-Qaeda as the most dangerous 
terrorist group in the world. One of the factors 
that contribute to the phenomena is how ISIS‟s 
method of recruiting foreign fighters differs 
from Al-Qaeda. After 9/11, we see a 
multinational effort led by the U.S to engage 
terrorism on a global scale. National security 
was top priority to prevent such event to occur 
again, and it was harder for Al-Qaeda to 
develop its terrorist cells in western territories. 
From this point on, the concept of foreign 
fighters of terrorist groups plays an important 
role in emphasizing ISIS as a global threat. 
Of course, the role of foreign fighters 
is not exclusive for ISIS only, but what made it 
different are the countries where ISIS recruited 
their fighters. Even though Al-Qaeda‟s scope 
of target is broader than ISIS they were only 
able to recruit the majority of their foreign 
fighters from countries surrounding Saudi 
Arabia such as Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen, and 
Libya.
8
 The background of these foreign 
                                                          
7
 Zachary Laub, “The Islamic State” , Council on 
Foreign Relations, last updated 10 August 2016, 
accessed 11 July 2017,  
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islamic-state. 
8
 Tony Cartalucci, “NATO Using Al Qaeda “Rat 
Lines” to Flood Syria With Foreign Terrorists”, 
fighters is generally from well-respected 
families with college education, and although 
they received prior training in Afghanistan, the 
western theatre will be the first real combat 
experience for most of them.
9
 Al-Qaeda is 
losing their strength with the death of Osama 
bin-Laden in 2011 and constant drone 
airstrikes that forced their top leaders into 
hiding. With a command structure that relied 
heavily on top-down communication it was 
significantly difficult for the group to continue 
its operations outside its own border.
10
 
On the other hand, ISIS can attract 
individuals from western countries to come to 
Iraq or Syria and send them back to their home 
country with much ease. ISIS recruited their 
fighters without considering if they came from 
a well-educated background or not, took in 
volunteers with criminal records such as car 
hijacking and bank robbery and give them a 
new sense of purpose.
11
 When they return to 
their home country, there will risk of being 
tracked by screening measures from 
government authorities, but the overwhelming 
number of have made their travel as easy as 
using only their passports.
12
  
ISIS related incidents in the West have 
greater impact than Al-Qaeda‟s. First, these 
foreign fighters have returned to their 
respective neighborhoods which gave the 
advantage of minimal security problems and 
they can conduct their operations on familiar 
                                                                                    
Global Research last modified 26 October 2012, 
accessed 11 July 2017 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-using-al-qaeda-
rat-lines-to-flood-syria-with-foreign-
terrorists/5309573  
9
 Clint Watts, “Why ISIS Beats al Qaeda in 
Europe”, Foreign Affairs, last modified 4 April 
2016, accessed 11 July 2017 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-
04/why-isis-beats-al-qaeda-europe 
10Clint Watts, “Al Qaeda Loses Touch”, Foreign 
Affairs, last modified 4 February 2015, accessed 11 
July 2017 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-
east/2015-02-04/al-qaeda-loses-touch 
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Op Cit.  
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grounds. Second, they often have strong 
relations with each other as life-long friends 
that returned from ISIS‟s training together, and 
since most have previous criminal records they 
are not troubled taking such activities even 
further. Lastly, ISIS differs from Al-Qaeda‟s 
top-down structure and fits the more 
clandestine/ terrorist cell structure perfectly.
13
  
Its foreign fighters are tightly-knitted and able 
to operate autonomously, unlike Al-Qaeda‟s 
command structure which required frequent 
communication that can be traced, ISIS 
terrorist cells can prepare and execute their 
plan with less risk of being found-out. 
 
ISIS Empowered Through Social Media  
The advancement of internet and the 
world wide web contributes a significant part 
to how ISIS spread its propaganda of terror, 
and how it even uses the social media as a 
recruitment tool for foreign fighters. This part 
of the essay will discuss how ISIS utilize social 
media to inspire and even radicalize supporters 
that even never had combat training or 
travelled to Iraq and Syria, and present one 
case study that happened in the U.S.  
It should be noted first that Al-Qaeda 
pioneered the use of internet to spread its 
message, it even has its own in-house 
production team named Al-Sahab that 
produced video about their leaders, images of 
battles with Al-Qaeda members, and other 
messages intended to gain appeal for the public 
in Middle Eastern countries.
14
 These materials 
were then spread to forums or groups that 
sympathized with Al-Qaeda to be individually 
emailed, the individuals that have joined the 
mailing list are then given a link that led them 
                                                          
13
 Clint Watts, “Why ISIS Beats al Qaeda in 
Europe”, Foreign Affairs, last modified 4 April 
2016, accessed 11 July 2017 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-
04/why-isis-beats-al-qaeda-europe 
14
 Hassan M. Fattah, “Al Qaeda Increasingly 
Reliant on Media”, New York Times, last modified 
30 April 2006, accessed 15 July 2017 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/world/30jorda
n.html 
to an encrypted website, where they can gather 
the propaganda materials and spread them 
discreetly.
15
 Furthermore, the videos that were 
circulated around are not always depiction of 
call to arms that arouse people to join, but in a 
form of scholarly preaches to appeal to a 
broader array of citizens as well. 
First is the principle of both group in 
how it spread its propaganda, similar to how 
ISIS does not concern itself with methodical 
approach in recruiting its foreign fighters, the 
group likewise boast openness and even 
crowdsourcing with netizens without concerns 
of the individual‟s background. ISIS does not 
worry itself with encrypted messages or 
password-protected websites that only a few 
carefully selected sympathizers can access, but 
instead spread around its ideology akin to an 
open-source material that anyone can use.
16
 
This open source material attracted people with 
unstable mental conditions, those who feel 
desperate and deluded can construct their own 
narrative of channeling their inner rage 
towards their society. If the goal of spreading 
terror is achieved, it is not a problem for ISIS. 
Take for example the 2015‟s San 
Bernardo Shooting that killed fourteen people 
in South California, U.S. It was unthinkable 
that the two perpetrators would be a husband 
and wife that were U.S citizens, and when 
investigated further close relatives of the 
family were shocked and unaware the married 
couple were radicalized. Syed Ridwan Farook 
was born in Illinois and raised in California, 
the husband met his wife through an online 
dating service in Saudi Arabia. While Tashfeen 
Malik was born in Pakistan and raised in Saudi 
Arabia, but eventually acquired legal 
                                                          
15
 Ibid. 
 
16
 Brendan I. Koerner, “Why ISIS Is Winning the 
Social Media War”, WIRED, last modified April 
2016, accessed 15 July 2017 
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-
social-media-war-heres-beat/#slide-x 
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permanent status in the States.
17
 The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) presumed that 
the couple were radicalized through the 
internet.
18
 As the fact shown they did not 
return to Saudi Arabia nor Pakistan after their 
marriage, it was further presumed that Malik 
was already radicalized prior to living in the 
U.S and influenced her husband afterwards. 
Before the shooting begun, it was described 
that the couple swore their allegiance to ISIS 
through posting on Facebook (FB).
19
 Both 
were killed in a shootout against the police, 
authorities then found the couple original plan 
of using bombs strapped to a remote-controlled 
toy in the scene of the massacre in the SUV 
used for the attack.
20
 Additional investigation 
unraveled there were traces of digital footprint 
being erased from their computer and 
cellphones being destroyed, and a makeshift 
bomb lab was found in their house.  
Later ISIS praised the couple as 
supporters who were martyred for their cause. 
As far as including their story in their monthly 
magazine titled Dabiq, and even justifying the 
husband and wife decision to leave behind 
their daughter by referencing excerpts from the 
Holy Quran.
21
 The magazine itself can be 
considered professional work, structured neatly 
imitating real magazines with foreword, 
headline story, topic of the month, selected 
videos to watch, and so forth. It is well-written 
in English language and can be misleading to 
those who did not understand Islam bound to 
be radicalized.  
From this case study, we can infer 
even though there are no further reports 
whether Farook and Malik were radicalized by 
                                                          
17
 Faith Karimi, “San Bernardino shooters 
'supporters' of ISIS, terror group says”, CNN, last 
modified 6 December 2015, accessed 15 July 2017 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/05/us/san-
bernardino-shooting/index.html 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21“Dabiq, 13th Issue”, last modified 2015, 
http://clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13-
the-rafidah.pdf 
ISIS through social media, the evidence and 
turn of events fit seamlessly with ISIS‟s social 
media strategies. The link that can be deducted 
start with how the couple were U.S citizens 
that never travelled to ISIS strongholds in Iraq 
or Syria and never received any combat 
training from ISIS members as well. From the 
story we know that, Malik was radicalized 
prior to marrying Farook and started 
influencing his husband after they settled back 
in the U.S, most likely the radicalization 
process continued online. This deduction can 
be further emphasized with how they pledge 
their allegiance to ISIS through their Facebook 
account before the incident occurred and how 
authorities found digital footprints in their 
house that could very well be linked to ISIS.  
Another social media strategy that 
ISIS use is peer to peer messaging app such as 
Telegram. While there are many similar app to 
choose from, ISIS particularly uses Telegram 
for its privacy policy that enables it to send 
encrypted messages in large format up to 1 
GB.  The large format enables them to send 
video instructions of how to make bombs from 
everyday utensils or coordinate attacks in a 
more detailed manner. The 13
th
 November 
2015 in France was orchestrated by ISIS with 
the use of Telegram, they could conduct a 
simultaneous attack on various public location 
which was a concert hall, a stadium, 
restaurants and bars, resulting in 130 
casualties.
22
 Unlike Al-Qaeda‟s attack on 
Charlie Hebdo‟s Magazine earlier in January, 
ISIS did not target places or group that has 
ideological implications on it. The magazine in 
France was known to produce satirical 
illustrations that offended many, including 
depiction of Prophet Muhammad which is 
strictly forbidden in Islam. This had led Al-
Qaeda to plan the attack for years and claim it 
                                                          
22
 Rowan Scarborough, “Islamic State using app to 
broadcast terror instructions, propaganda”, 
Washington Times, last modified January 8 2017, 
accessed 18 July 2017 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/8/
isis-using-telegram-app-to-broadcast-terror-instru/ 
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as a „revenge for honor‟ because of Charlie 
Hebdo‟s inappropriate depiction.23  
From had been gathered up to now, 
ISIS is considerably different than its 
predecessor Al-Qaeda in terms of ideology and 
strategies. While Al-Qaeda is focused on the 
narrative of fighting the West and depict them 
as a threat to Islam, ISIS expand it further by 
creating an Islamic caliphate as its main goal 
and fighting the West that gets in the way. In 
terms of strategy, we know that Al-Qaeda 
prefer a methodical approach in creating terror 
in western countries, and it even spread its 
propaganda carefully as to make sure the 
source is not traced back.  On the other hand, 
ISIS embrace openness for its ideology to be 
crowdsourced for anyone that wants to craft 
their own individual narrative with ISIS 
branding. The result was they would be able to 
recruit more foreign fighters from western 
countries, encourage individuals that are non-
affiliated to be lone wolf attackers, and claim 
the result of the attack for themselves, 
increasing their unpredictability and threat 
level. 
 
ISIS Current Condition  
True to its goals of creating a caliphate 
based on its own perspective of Islam, ISIS has 
achieved more than just creating a reign of 
terror. Since 2014, the terrorist group has 
controlled massive territories and strategic 
point in both Iraq and Syria, creating its own 
government inside those controlled territories, 
imposing its own sharia laws, and inspired 
other jihadist groups from different continent 
to pledge their allegiance and do the same. The 
first to be captured was the city of Raqqa in 
northern Syria, it was the first major city 
captured by ISIS. From that point on it had 
captured Mosul (the second largest city of 
                                                          
23Karl Vick, “Al-Qaeda Group Claims 
Responsibility for Paris Terror Attack”,TIME,  last 
modified 10 January 2015, accessed 18 July 2017 
http://time.com/3661650/charlie-hebdo-paris-terror-
attack-al-qaeda/ 
Iraq) and another city called Tikrit, conquering 
a large section of northern Iraq that links to 
east of Syria from the city of Raqqa to Deir ez-
Zor.
24
 It was by this time, ISIS had officially 
declared its caliphate.  
Despite its advancement of both Iraq 
and Syria, ISIS gained territories that were far 
too outstretched to be well-defended. And, 
ISIS did not just face the U.S and its 
international coalition forces but opposing 
Shi‟a tribes notably Kurdish minorities as well. 
Two years after declaring its caliphate ISIS 
had suffered major losses in both Syria and 
Iraq. U.S backed alliance of Arab and Kurdish 
fighters are besieging the town of Raqqa while 
on July 10
th
 this year Iraqi government forces 
have declared the city of Mosul to be liberated 
from ISIS.
25
 While many would see the turn of 
events as a positive progress in the war against 
terrorism, scholars and policy makers alike are 
concerned of the underlying threat after the 
caliphate crumbles. The scenario of mass 
exodus of ISIS fighters to other countries and 
even the possibility of ISIS relocating their 
strongholds. 
 
Marawi, a Narrative for a New Caliphate 
Thus, earlier in May this year, the 
world was caught in surprise as ISIS captured 
the city of Marawi in Mindanao, Philippines 
and raised the regional awareness of terrorist 
threats to new heights. The island of Mindanao 
which was eventually under the state of 
Martial Law was historically known to house 
several terrorist group that has different 
motives and level of threat to the government. 
Such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) that started more than three decades of 
                                                          
24Pamela Engel, “This map shows how much 
territory ISIS has lost this year”, Business Insider, 
last modified 21 December 2015, accessed 18 July 
2017, http://www.businessinsider.sg/map-how-
much-territory-isis-lost-2015-12/?r=US&IR=T. 
25
 BBC News, “Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq 
and Syria in maps”, BBC, last modified January 
2016, accessed 18 July 2017 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
27838034 
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rebellion against the government for a more 
autonomous rule of Mindanao and Muslim 
Moro minorities, the group had reached a 
positive progress with the government where 
in 2014 the peace treaty of “Comprehensive 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro” was signed.26  
The same year was the start of ISIS‟s spread of 
influence in the country with the help of social 
media. 
The Institute of Policy Analysis on 
Conflict (IPAC) retraced the presence of ISIS 
from the start of May 2014, where a video 
showed Nine Filipinos swearing their 
allegiance to Al-Baghdadi in Arabic, then 
finishing the speech in Tagalog. IPAC also 
assumed Indonesians were involved, seeing 
how the opening credits showed a stamp 
written in Bahasa Indonesia.
27
 The series of 
events afterward included various pledges 
from different terrorist factions in Mindanao 
and eventually formed the coalition of „Daulah 
Islamiyah Wilayatul Mashriq‟ or IS – East 
Asia Region. Furthermore, fast forward to the 
first few days of the clashes between 
Government forces and ISIS, the Telegram app 
played an important role in spreading the news 
of the captured city and inviting other 
extremists to join the fight. Telegram was also 
used to spread around the message that 
supporters of terrorist groups in the country to 
start referring the terrorist faction as Junudul 
Khifalah (soldiers of the state), IS fighters, IS 
of East Asia, it was specifically ordered by 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria to refrain the use of 
                                                          
26
Agence France-Presse, “Timeline: Moro history 
in the southern Philippines”, ABS-CBN, last 
modified 28 March 2014, accessed 20 July 2017 
http://news.abs-
cbn.com/nation/regions/03/27/14/timeline-moro-
history-southern-philippines. 
27
 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 
“MARAWI, THE “EAST ASIA WILAYAH” AND 
INDONESIA”, last modified 21 July 2017, 
accessed 26 July 2017 
http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/07/IP
AC_Report_38.pdf , Pg. 2. 
 
terms that shows ethnical, regional, or national 
difference.
28
  
This recent turn of event implicitly 
showed how much impact the use of ISIS‟s 
narrative can make, regarding viewing it as a 
crowdsource material. It can be very well 
perceived as a brand, much like attaching a 
sponsorship logo to a racing car to boost its 
profile. Take the specific case of Isnilon 
Hapilon, a former Abu Sayaff terrorist faction 
that was wounded in battle with Philippines 
government forces, declared his allegiance and 
was proclaimed as the “Emir” of ISIS in East 
Asia. Or Omar and Abdullah Maute, two 
brothers who were educated in Al-Azhar 
University of Egypt and Abdullah University 
in Jordan, they pledged their allegiance and 
cleverly used their strong family connections 
with MILF to acquire the necessary resources 
and funding.
29
 The use of ISIS as brand had 
even attracted MILF fighters who were 
disappointed with the peace negotiation 
progress with the government. The unpreceded 
event lead to MILF leaning to the government 
of Philippines in order to contain ISIS, where 
Mohagher Iqbal - Chief Negotiator of MILF 
said the group is willing to take an active role 
to put an end to the fighting in Marawi with 
greater regards in civilian interest.
30
  
 
ISIS In Indonesia: Past And Present 
Retracing back to early 2000 in 
Indonesia, the country with the highest number 
of Muslim population. This section will 
compare Al-Qaeda‟s presence in Indonesia 
with ISIS, how does ISIS maneuver in its 
earliest role and how will the Marawi incident 
                                                          
28
 Ibid. Pg. 8. 
29
 Jonathan Head, “Maute rebel group: A rising 
threat to Philippines”, last modified 31 May 2017, 
accessed 27 July 2017 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40103602 
30
 Ryan Rosauro, “MILF willing to help end 
Marawi crisis”, last modified 28 June 2017, 
accessed 27 July 2017, 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/909394/milf-willing-to-
play-role-to-resolve-marawi-crisis-if 
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affects it? With regards to how ISIS employed 
its social media propaganda strategy as 
explained in the previous part of the essay. 
The presence of Al-Qaeda in the 
country can be recognized by Jemaah Islamiah 
(JI) as the group‟s representative. JI was the 
perpetrators for the devastating Bali Bombing I 
& II that took the lives of many foreign 
citizens, the J.W Marriot Hotel bombings, and 
the Australian Embassy bombing. From the 
location and casualties, Jemaah Islamiah is 
following Al-Qaeda‟s narrative in fighting 
against western countries as non-believers.  
At this period, Jemaah Islamiah members were 
recruited from religious schools or madrasah 
that share the same radical values. These 
radicalized students who developed a narrow 
perspective of Muslim against non-Muslim 
world would then only interact with each other 
forming a „beehive‟ of friendship and 
cooperation that are highly hostile against 
others that have different values.
31
 For 
example, most  JI members who were involved 
in the Bali Bombings once attended the same 
madrasah or are associated with students of the 
place.
32
 These incubators for radical extremist 
also appeared in Malaysia, creating a network 
of radical hotspots in Southeast Asia.  
The pattern that appeared was in 
correlation with how Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
would operate, their network grows in a 
limited manner of like-minded individuals, and 
they would operate methodically with interval 
of a few years before another bombing attack 
was commenced, furthermore the hotspots also 
helps the authorities to monitor the spread and 
flow of extremists. But that pattern did not stay 
long as the influence of Al-Qaeda in Southeast 
Asia wane during a decade. In 2014 Abu Bakar 
Bashir as the leader of JI pledged his loyalty to 
ISIS, this event has increased the underlying 
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terrorism threat level in Indonesia significantly 
as ISIS now can not only manipulate 
individuals to be potential attackers, but have a 
rooster of madrasah grown extremists in their 
disposal as well. 
From here on, the sequence of 
bombing attacks changed considerably whether 
from the perpetrators, targets, and modus 
operandi. Starting from the Sarinah Starbucks 
Bombing in Jakarta, 14 January 2016. The 
mastermind of this attack was Bahrun Naim, a 
University of Solo graduate with an 
Information Technology (IT) degree and 
worked as a computer technician. He was 
locally radicalized before joining IS in Raqqa, 
2014.
33
 The suicide bombing targeted a police 
post placed in a middle of a large road 
intersection, but killed four civilians instead. It 
was reported that Bahrun Naim coordinated the 
attack using Telegram after his other social 
media accounts were suspended while he was 
still in Syria.
34
 Additionally, in the end of 
2016, the police force has foiled a terrorist plot 
that includes a pressure cooker bomb and a 
female would be suicide bomber. They were 
planning to attack a ceremony taking place in 
the Presidential Palace, choosing Sunday as 
there would be many family bystanders 
attending the event.
35
 Further investigation by 
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the police showed the attackers linked to 
Bahrun Naim. 
 The year 2017 also saw two incidents 
involving the same bomb and attackers linked 
to ISIS. On February 27th an explosion 
occurred in Pandawa park, Bandung. 
Unfortunately, there were no casualties, and 
further investigation by the police shows how 
one of the attackers named Yayat Chadiyat 
was linked to Bahrun Naim again. He was 
previously arrested in 2012 with charges of 
providing illegal firearm and ammunition to 
the mastermind of Sarinah Bombing prior 
when Naim was still living in Solo-
Purwakarta.
36
 To conclude, along the span of 
one year there were already new forms of lone 
wolf attacks coordinated by a fellow 
Indonesian extremist from Syria. With the use 
of one peer to peer app that can send encrypted 
messages in large format, Bahrun Naim used 
Telegram to inspire his fellow extremists to 
create homemade bombs and attack two major 
cities in Indonesia.  
 The evolution of ISIS radicalization 
through social media doesn‟t just appeal to 
Indonesian males only. Based on an article 
written by an IPAC researcher there is a new 
phenomenon of migrant maids and nannies in 
Hongkong, Taiwan, and Singapore radicalized 
through social media at a small but alarming 
rate.
37
 The researcher interviewed a radicalized 
Indonesian maid with the pseudonym name of 
Ayu – aged 34 – who also is the head of ISIS 
supporters network in Hong Kong. She left for 
Hong Kong in 2003 to run away from abusive 
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in-laws and succumbed to alcohol and drugs to 
numb depression. Eight years later after 
consequently losing her job as a maid for the 
third time, she went to Macau and lived on the 
streets for some time. 
 From there, she started to surf the 
internet looking for Islamic websites, looking 
for a spiritual refuge. But instead she was 
caught by the news happening in Syria and 
started befriending jihadists from social media. 
Ayu then returned to Hong Kong to join a 
Salafist Institute that was run by a non-
extremist, she was reported by her teacher 
because of her vocal support of ISIS and left in 
2014. She started translating propaganda 
materials from English to Indonesian for ISIS, 
spreading it through Twitter and Telegram. 
Eventually marrying an Indonesian Jihadist 
and introduced to the inner circles of 
Indonesian pro ISIS groups.  
 The article then stated that from 
combined reports of IPAC and the Indonesian 
police force from 500.000 Indonesian migrant 
worker who worked in the three countries 
stated before, there are about 45 who actively 
support ISIS. As said, it is a small number but 
to relate to the previous incident of the foiled 
bombing plan, it is possible that the female 
would be suicide bomber has similar 
background such as the story of Ayu. It is also 
concerning that these maids are more 
resourceful than most Indonesian ISIS 
supporters as they can establish international 
connection and have better English language. 
In Hong Kong, radicalized maids like Ayu 
would then congregate in Islamic study circles 
known as pengajian. 
 
Indonesia’s Response TO The Growing 
Threat 
 There are three responses by the 
government of Indonesia that the writer will 
discuss. First, eleven Telegram domains had 
been blocked in Indonesia, second the 
involvement of religious clerics from NU and 
Muhammadiyah organization in the 
154  Naufal Armia Arifin The Evolution Of  ISIS In Indonesia With Regards To Its Social Media Strategy 
 
 
 
deradicalization process, and third the ban of 
civil organization that are deemed as a threat to 
national security. As we know, over the case 
studies described, ISIS favored Telegram app 
as its main media of communication, the 
impact alone had been tremendous as one 
person such as Bahrun Naim can be a 
mastermind to two terror related incidents in 
Jakarta and Bandung. While, U.S and Europe 
had pleaded the creator of Telegram to block 
domains that were related to terrorists, the 
effort had been in disdain as only 78 channels 
were closed off out of hundreds of thousands. 
The creator insisted that it cannot close off all 
channel to guarantee the freedom of 
expression.
38
 Although it may seem like a 
quick solution for the government to block the 
main app that ISIS use for communication, 
many analysts agreed that it will be a pointless 
effort as ISIS can easily outmaneuver to a 
different messaging app, even right now many 
citizens call still use the app using a simple 
method using a Virtual Private Network 
(VPN).
39
  
 Second, over the transition from Al-
Qaeda to ISIS attacks in Indonesia, the police 
force is often considered as the main targets by 
ISIS supporters, mainly due to the reason of 
the high achievement of Densus 88 
(Indonesia‟s Counter Terrorism Police Unit) in 
capturing or eliminating terrorist suspects over 
the past decade. One of the strategy used is to 
let police personnel mingle with terrorist 
captives, as many of the personnel are devout 
Muslims, they would take prayers together and 
conversed afterwards. This would denounce 
the myth ISIS has been building towards police 
forces that they are working together with non-
believers against Islam. The enhancement of 
this strategy came from many intellectual and 
moderately religious institutions declaring their 
support including NU and Muhammadiyah as 
the two largest moderate Islam organization in 
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Indonesia. Public and private universities also 
voiced their support, such as the 
Antiradicalism and Terrorism Declaration 
made by 44 universities in West Sumatra.  
 Third, the ban of radical Muslim 
organization such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 
(HTI) in recent news. HTI is known for its 
vocal support of the inducting Sharia law to the 
nation‟s ideology, essentially in line with 
ISIS‟s goal of creating a caliphate. Stated by 
Wiranto, Indonesia‟s Minister for Political, 
Legal, and Security Affairs, "The activities of 
HTI strongly indicate that they have conflict 
with the Pancasila and the constitution."
40
 HTI 
is one of the few radical Muslim organization 
that brazenly oppose the idea of Pancasila and 
tolerance, the other including Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI). 
 
Conclusion 
From Al-Qaeda to ISIS, these two 
group share the spotlight of being a global 
terrorism threat almost over the past two 
decades ago. Although both share the same 
Sunni hardline Salafist ideology, they differ 
greatly in other important aspects. First is their 
goal in mind, Al-Qaeda‟s goal is based on 
fighting off the west that they consider as non-
believer or kafir while ISIS‟s narrative 
expanded it even further with the creation of a 
caliphate. Second is their method of recruiting 
foreign fighters and how they coordinate their 
attack in other countries. While Al-Qaeda 
takes a more careful approach of recruiting 
foreign fighters that have well-educated 
background, they have not been very 
successful in infiltrating their fighters to 
western countries. ISIS on the other hand 
manage to do so because of its openness in 
recruiting almost everyone without a 
background check, this strategy has resulted in 
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foreign fighters that were recruited from the 
western countries they sought to attack, given 
combat training, and returned to their home 
country as sleeper cells.  
This is also related to the third point of 
how Al-Qaeda and ISIS spread their ideology. 
Al-Qaeda prefer encrypted websites and 
connection with trusted sympathizers whom 
they can email their propaganda materials. 
Meanwhile ISIS employ a more open tactic 
that heavily rely on current social media, 
crowdsourcing their propaganda material so 
that anyone especially those who were deeply 
troubled can use ISIS‟s ideology and craft it 
for their own cause with ISIS as its brand. 
ISIS‟s strategy of employing foreign fighters 
and spreading its propaganda through social 
media proves to be successful, where multiple 
attacks by lone wolf attackers that would later 
be identified as ISIS supporters occurred 
multiple time in U.S and Europe.  
However, the loss that ISIS is 
experiencing in Iraq and Syria creates the 
possibility of creating another caliphate in 
Southeast Asia, as it is a region with major 
Muslim population and history of radicalism 
particularly present in Indonesia and 
Philippines. As of May 2017, a coalition of 
local terrorist groups in Philippines declared 
their allegiance to ISIS and captured the city of 
Marawi, in the Muslim majority island of 
Mindanao. This turn of event can impact how 
ISIS operates in Indonesia, as the country with 
the highest number of Muslims. 
Threading on further, Al-Qaeda in 
Indonesia, known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has 
also pledged his support to ISIS. Evolving the 
method of operation from Bali and Australian 
Embassy Bombings that were carefully 
planned and span few years to sporadic attacks 
not by ISIS fighters but lone supporters over 
the span of one year, with the help of social 
media such as Telegram. The radicalization 
process by ISIS has also reached female 
Indonesian migrant workers abroad in 
Hongkong, Taiwan, and Singapore with ISIS‟s 
social media strategy playing a huge part. 
There were three counter strategy that the 
Indonesian government employed, first the 
government has blocked eleven Telegram 
domains to disrupt communication and spread 
of ISIS propaganda. Although deemed 
ineffective by analysts, it provides a quick and 
temporary solution specially to minimize the 
propaganda effect of ISIS‟s victory in Marawi. 
But the government should not just block 
social media app that ISIS use, they should 
utilize it for deradicalization process as well.  
Second, as moderate Islamic 
institutions such as NU and Muhammadiyah 
join the deradicalization effort, they must 
utilize social media similar to how ISIS use it 
as well. This is to ensure that the 
deradicalization process is not only applied to 
level of captured terrorist suspects or students 
from an extremist madrasah, but the effort 
resonates through the whole social media and 
internet to help minimize the chance of lone 
wolf attacks to occur again. It should also 
assist in deradicalizing Indonesians that are 
outside the country, such as the migrant 
workers case mentioned before. The 
government can utilize the media by providing 
stories of refugees from ISIS-held territories, 
or show a speech by a deradicalized terrorist 
member to tell the truth about ISIS.  
Third, the disbandment of HTI is a 
positive effort to reduce the radicalization 
process in mass effect. But it can impose the 
problem of HTI members turning to a more 
extremist attitude as they are unable to voice 
their ideas through legitimate and peaceful 
actions, the momentum can be used by ISIS in 
accordance with its Philippines caliphate 
campaign. Supporters of ISIS may join the 
battle in Marawi and return more dangerous as 
they have acquired combat experience.  
Indonesia is facing a new level of threat from 
ISIS based on the events of Marawi, although 
the government has taken first measures to halt 
the threat, it must also consider the strategy to 
counter the radicalization process by ISIS 
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through the means of social media in the long 
run.  
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